Method and system for policy-based address allocation for secure unique local networks

ABSTRACT

The present invention advantageously provides a method, system and apparatus for allocating addresses to secure unique local networks by providing a brokered federated policy and identity management system, the brokered federated policy and identity management system having an address domain manager that allocates network addresses, the address domain manager arranged to interoperate with a network identity management module, the network identity management module providing management of identity at an application level, receiving an authorization from the brokered federated policy and identity management system, and assigning a network address to a unique local network based on the authorization from the brokered federated policy and identity management system. The method, system and apparatus may further include authenticating a user, wherein authenticating a user includes passing an assertion token to a device of the user. The method, system and apparatus may yet further include providing user policies to a policy enforcement point in a network.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION

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STATEMENT REGARDING FEDERALLY SPONSORED RESEARCH OR DEVELOPMENT

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FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to communication networks, and moreparticularly to a method, system and apparatus that provides forpolicy-based address allocation.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Users of services and resources from enterprise and service providersoften have multiple public and private identifiers. People may haveidentities associated with different roles, e.g., at work, at home, andassociated with hobbies, sports, and community activities. Users mayroam, and are increasingly mobile. With the current diversity ofavailable communication options, an individual user may have multiplecommunication devices, desktop personal computers (“PC”), personal dataassistance (“PDA”), mobile phone, or other devices for using differentapplications, voice telephony, instant messaging, email webapplications, enterprise resource planning (“ERP”), video,collaboration/conferencing and the like.

Users therefore typically have needed to sign-on and be authenticatedfor different applications, and for different types of communicationplatforms. Single-sign-on (“SSO”) may be available for some groups ofapplications, but often users may need to sign on separately fordifferent communications. When users change networks, they will usuallybe required to sign-on and re-authenticate, particularly when changingbetween public and private networks. Although network security ingeneral has seen increased priority in view of Sarbanes Oxley (“SOX”)laws, Health Information Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”),and other regulatory and business security compliance requirements forprotection of confidential information, the protection of critical dataon private networks remains a most vital concern.

The confidentially, integrity and privacy of critical data on privatenetworks is subject to a variety of attacks including snooping, identityspoofing and data alteration. Many attackers attempt to gain access to aprivate network by attacking an employee's notebook computer, othercomputers on an employee's home network, the public internet, a wirelesslocal area network (“WLAN”) or the like. Each and every time an employeeremotely accesses a company's private network, the security of criticaldata on a private network is in peril, however, numerous new networkingfeatures are provided as part of Internet Protocol version 6 (“IPv6”),including the use of IPv6 unique local addressing, which is globallyunique and locally routable for use within a private organization asdefined by request for comments (“RFC”) 4193. Moreover, the IPv6 basestandards also call for the use of multi-netting (the presence ofmultiple IPv6 network addresses) at the host level. The combination ofthese two features provide for a very dynamic concurrency in logicalnetwork presence. Although this combination offers an immense amount offlexibility there is great deal of concern regarding aspects ofmanageability and security. In particular, these features potentiallyprovide numerous additional paths for an attacker to use in her attemptsto access, intercept or destroy critical data on private networks.

What is desired is an arrangement under which the unique localaddressing feature and the multi-netting feature can be managed toprovide the ability to allocate addresses to the unique local addressingspace in a secure manner.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

It is to be understood that both the following summary and the detaileddescription are exemplary and explanatory and are intended to providefurther explanation of the invention as claimed. Neither the summary northe description that follows is intended to define or limit the scope ofthe invention to the particular features mentioned in the summary or inthe description.

The present invention advantageously provides a method, system andapparatus for allocating addresses to secure unique local networks byproviding a brokered federated policy and identity management system,the brokered federated policy and identity management system having anaddress domain manager that allocates network addresses, the addressdomain manager arranged to interoperate with a network identitymanagement module, the network identity management module providingmanagement of identity at an application level, receiving anauthorization from the brokered federated policy and identity managementsystem, and assigning a network address to a unique local network basedon the authorization from the brokered federated policy and identitymanagement system.

In accordance with one aspect, the present invention provides a methodfor allocating addresses to secure unique local networks. The method forallocating addresses to secure unique local networks includes allocatingaddresses to secure unique local networks by providing a brokeredfederated policy and identity management system, the brokered federatedpolicy and identity management system having an address domain managerthat allocates network addresses, the address domain manager arranged tointeroperate with a network identity management module, the networkidentity management module providing management of identity at anapplication level, receiving an authorization from the brokeredfederated policy and identity management system, and assigning a networkaddress to a unique local network based on the authorization from thebrokered federated policy and identity management system. The method mayfurther include authenticating a user, wherein authenticating a userincludes passing an assertion token to a device of the user. The methodmay yet further include pushing down user policies to a policyenforcement point in a network.

In accordance with another aspect, the present invention provides asystem for allocating addresses to secure unique local networks. Thesystem for allocating addresses to secure unique local networks includesa brokered federated policy and identity management system, the brokeredfederated policy and identity management system having an address domainmanager that allocates network addresses, the address domain managerarranged to interoperate with a network identity management module, thenetwork identity management module providing management of identity atan application level. The system may further include a policy decisionfunction, an authentication broker, a secure network access broker, anda threat protection system wherein the threat protection system overseesand monitors the first SULN for anomalies.

In accordance with yet another aspect, the present invention provides amethod for allocating addresses to secure unique local networks. Themethod for allocating addresses to secure unique local networks byreceiving notification of an attempt by a user to access a privatenetwork, assigning the user a first virtual local area network (VLAN),assigning the user a first virtual local area network (VLAN),authenticating the user, passing an assertion token to a device of theauthenticated user, assigning a common default address to the device ofthe user, receiving a request from the user to access a securedapplication, the secured application residing on a first secure uniquelocal network (SULN), and assigning a network address to the first SULNauthenticating the user.

The method may further include verifying an assertion token from theuser and placing the user into a second virtual local area network(VLAN). The method may further include providing user policies to apolicy enforcement point in a network and assigning the IP address ofthe first secure unique local network (SULN) to the device of the user.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

A more complete understanding of the present invention, and theattendant advantages and features thereof, will be more readilyunderstood by reference to the following detailed description whenconsidered in conjunction with the accompanying drawings wherein:

FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a network hosting an address allocationsystem of an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a virtual route forwarding function used inan embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 3 is a block diagram of an address allocation system of anembodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 4 is a flowchart of a process for address allocation in accordancewith the principles of the present invention; and

FIG. 5 is a more detailed flowchart of a process for address allocationin accordance with the principles of the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

Referring to the drawing figures in which like reference designatorsrefer to like elements, there is shown in FIG. 1 a block diagram of anetwork, designated as network 10 illustrating an address allocationsystem functionality in accordance with the principles of the presentinvention. FIG. 1 illustrates that the IPv6 address domain manager (“ADM(DHCP/DNS)”) 108 has been merged into the federated policy and identitymanagement system or framework (“IDM-FPF”) 100. The ADM (DHCP/DNS) 108provides or manages the domain name system (“DNS”) and the dynamic hostconfiguration protocol (“DHCP”) to provide IP addressing for the network10. When the ADM (DHCP/DNS) 108 is merged into the IDM-FPF 100, itprovides a user-centric assignment of IPv6 unique local networks (“ULN”)and also provides an organization with the ability to assign addresseswith a very high granularity and assurance against a policy authorityframework. In other words, the merger of the ADM (DHCP/DNS) 108functionality into the IDM-FPF 100 provides a network with thecapability to create secure unique local networks (“SULN”) that arerouted by the network routing elements as separate routed planes thathave no network level connectivity and thus are separate or isolatedfrom that network. Accordingly, the entities on a SULN will be limitedto basically the routing elements interconnecting the address space andthe hosts that have been assigned addresses to that space by thefederated brokered policy system or framework. In this manner, the SULNprovides a dedicated, secure and isolated network for an applicationserver 118 and its active clients 112 and thus any data transmission onthe SULN can be monitored such that any attacks or unauthorized accesscan quickly be identified and terminated as all activity on the SULN isreadily attributable to given user 112. Except for the configuredrouting elements, the application server 118 is essentially the onlyother entity on the SULN. As the only way that other entities can gainaccess to the assigned address space is by IDM-FPF 100, the isolationand security of the SULN is very robust.

The IDM-FPF 100 also may comprise, but is not limited to, anauthentication broker (“AB”) 102, an policy decision function (“PDF”)104, a secure network access broker (“SNAB”) 106, such as the Nortelsecure network access (“NSNA”) switch, and threat protection and monitorsystems (“TP/MS”) 110. In addition, the network 10 may further include aprimary unique local network (or allocated Internet assigned numbersauthority (“IANA”) global identification (“ID”)) 114, multiple uniquelocal networks 116 (e.g., A through N) and application servers 118.

The AB 102 provides for the identification and authentication of a userwho desires to use/access the network 10. The PDF 104 is a policydecision function that distributes policies to policy enforcement points(“PEP”) 122 (shown in FIG. 2) that may be stored in switches, firewallsand the like. A PEP 122 is functionality available in switches andfirewalls and is responsible for the enforcement of specific policies(e.g., quality of service (“QoS”), restrictions to access, etc.). TheSNAB 106 is a virtual local area network (“VLAN”) port-based accesscontroller that can verify end-point (user device) compliance withspecific rules, delegate user authentication and receive userauthentication status and reverse proxy requests to applications.

FIG. 2 illustrates the virtual route forwarding (“VRF”) function 200 ofthe present invention. VRF 200 is based on the multi-netting feature ofIPv6, and allows the creation of virtual planes or tiers for routing inthe network. In this example, a single physical router/switch 202 isdefined to have three virtual routers 204, which in turn allow the flowof addressing and data across unique local networks (“ULNs”) (e.g., 1, 2and 3). Without VRF 200, policy based address allocation is an effectivemeans of managing the IPv6 address space based on human identity withinan organization. With VRF 200, unique local networks can be separatedand thereby secured. The combination of identity aware addressallocation and VRF 200 yield the concept of ‘secure’ unique localnetworks (“SULN”).

FIG. 3 illustrates an embodiment of the invention wherein the VRFfeature 200 is applied to ULN #A and ULN #B to create the isolated IPv6secure unique local networks (“SULN”) 115A and 115B. In this embodiment,the user/client 112 can plug a device into the network 10. As previouslydescribed with respect to FIG. 1, the network 10 comprises, but is notlimited to, IDM-FPF 100, AB 102, PDF 104, SNAB 105, ADM (DHCP/DNS) 108and TP/MS 110. In this embodiment, the network 10 further comprises afirst VLAN 111, which provides limited access to SNAB 106 and ADM(DHCP/DNS) 108, a second VLAN 113, which is specific for thatuser/client's role, a common default ULN 114, and SULN #A 115A andSULN#B 11B, which provide access to general application servers 118 andsecure application servers 120. A more detailed discussion of theoperation of this embodiment of network 10 follows below with respect toFIG. 5.

FIG. 4 illustrates a top-level methodology for the creation of thelogical element referred to herein as a secure unique local network(“SULN”) 115. The first step S10 is to incorporate the IPv6 addressmanagement (e.g., ADM (DHCP/DNS) 108) into the federated policy andidentity management framework (e.g., IDM-FPF 100) to create anauthorized gated method for IPv6 address allocation and the concept of asecure unique local network. The second step S12 provides for theassignment of IPv6 unique local network addresses based on authorizationfrom the federated policy and identity management framework for accessto a SULN 115. Step S14 provides for the incorporation of multiplerouting planes (e.g., VRF feature 204) to forward data associated withthe SULNs 115. Each routing plane has individual open shortest pathfirst (“OPSF”) protocol link weights and can thus route trafficindependently of the other planes. For example, each plane may be usedto route traffic of an equivalent QoS-class to meet performanceconstraints of that class. This allows for the concurrent usage of theseIPv6 SULNs 115 to be routed by the IPv6 network routing elements asseparate routed planes that have no network connectivity. Consequently,the only entities on a secure unique local network will be the routingelements interconnecting the address space and the hosts that have beenassigned addresses to that space by the federated brokered policyframework. The secure unique local network can provide a dedicated andisolated network for an application server and only its active clients.

The operation of one embodiment of the policy based address allocationsystem of network 10 is illustrated by the flowchart of FIG. 5. At stepS100, a user/client 112 can plug a device into the network 10 at whichtime the PEP 122 places the device into a first VLAN 111 (step S102),which will only allow access to the SNAB 106 and ADM (DHCP/DNS) 108. TheADM (DHCP/DNS) 108 assigns a temporary address for the first VLAN 111(step S104), and SNAB 106 can challenge the user for a proper log-on(step S106). The user/client 112 can respond to the challenge and can beauthenticated by AB 102 (step S108). If authenticated by AB 102, then AB102 can pass an assertion token to the user device (step S112);otherwise the user is notified that they do not have access to thenetwork (step S110). The SNAB 106 can then notify the PEP 122 to placethe user into a second VLAN 113 that is specific for that user/client's112 role (step S114). At step S116, the ADM (DHCP/DNS) 108 can thenassign the actual common ‘default’ IPv6 address 114 to the user/clientdevice. The PDF 104 can push down the user/role policies to the PEP 122(step S118).

Next, at step S120, the user may request access to a secure application120 (e.g., financial applications) and the assertion token is presentedto the IDM-FPF framework 100 (step S122). Upon approval, the IDM-FPFframework 100 notifies the ADM (DHCP/DNS) 108 to assign an IPv6 addressfor the SULN#A (step S124), and the ADM (DHCP/DNS) 108 assigns theSULN#A's IPv6 address to the user's device (step S126). At step S128,the PDF 104 can push down any additional user/role policies to the PEP122, while the TP/MS 110 oversees and monitors the SULN#A for anyanomalies or attacks on the secure application server 120 (step S130).The types of anomalies or attacks can include for example, the situationwhere an end user mounts a DOS attack on a secure server 120, or an enduser “spoofs” presence onto the IPv6 secure unique local network.

In general, the active clients are monitored for activity during thecourse of application interaction. Upon termination of the applicationsession, the IDM-FPF 100 may notify the dynamic host configurationprotocol in an IPv6 environment (“DHCPv6”) server, which is part of ADM(DHCP/DNS) 108 that the assigned address is to be revoked from the enduser. Depending on the level of security desired, a user/client 112might be allocated an IPv6 unique local address for only the activesession duration with the secure application server 120, which providesa more secure mode of operation. Otherwise, in a less secure mode, aclient is allocated all assigned ULNs that correspond to a set ofmanaged address pools for the SULN to which the user has been authorizedby the IDM-FPF 100. In either mode, the IDM-FPF 100 (and its TP/MS 110)can cause the revocation of any unique local address based on noticedanomalies of data. Alternatively, the leases may be revoked as a resultof an update in the supporting directory systems of the IDM-FPF 100.

Referring back to FIG. 3, in the event that a user mounts a DOS attackon a secure server 120, the TP/MS 110 will observe the anomaly and thennotify the PDF 104 in the IDM-FPF 100. The PDF 104 can reference the AB102 for the user identification data and then notify the ADM (DHCP/DNS)108 to revoke all network addresses. The PDF 104 and/or SNAB 106 canshut down the port by placing it in a safety VLAN (e.g., SULN#B 115B).The ADM (DHCP/DNS) 108 then revokes the lease on the IPv6 addresses toshut the DOS attacking user down.

In the event that a user spoofs the IPv6 address and obtains access to asecure application, the TP/MS 110 will observe the anomaly (e.g., bycomparing the IPv6 address and the token data (or lack thereof)) andthen notify the PDF 104 in the IDM-FPF 100. The PDF 104 can referencethe AB 102 for the user identification data if the token data exists,and then notify the ADM (DHCP/DNS) 108 to revoke all network addresses.The PDF 104 and/or SNAB 106 can shut down the port by placing it in asafety VLAN (e.g., SULN#B 115B). The ADM (DHCP/DNS) 108 then revokes thelease on the IPv6 addresses to shut the spoofing user down.

The present invention can be realized in hardware, software, or acombination of hardware and software. An implementation of the methodand system of the present invention can be realized in a centralizedfashion in one computing system or in a distributed fashion wheredifferent elements are spread across several interconnected computingsystems. Any kind of computing system, or other apparatus adapted forcarrying out the methods described herein, is suited to perform thefunctions described herein.

A typical combination of hardware and software could be a specialized orgeneral-purpose computer system having one or more processing elementsand a computer program stored on a storage medium that, when loaded andexecuted, controls the computer system such that it carries out themethods described herein. The present invention can also be embedded ina computer program product, which comprises all the features enablingthe implementation of the methods described herein, and which, whenloaded in a computing system is able to carry out these methods. Storagemedium refers to any volatile or non-volatile storage device.

Computer program or application in the present context means anyexpression, in any language, code or notation, of a set of instructionsintended to cause a system having an information processing capabilityto perform a particular function either directly or after either or bothof the following a) conversion to another language, code or notation; b)reproduction in a different material form. In addition, unless mentionwas made above to the contrary, it should be noted that all of theaccompanying drawings are not to scale. Significantly, this inventioncan be embodied in other specific forms without departing from thespirit or essential attributes thereof, and accordingly, referenceshould be had to the following claims, rather than to the foregoingspecification, as indicating the scope of the invention.

It will be appreciated by persons skilled in the art that the presentinvention is not limited to what has been particularly shown anddescribed herein above. A variety of modifications and variations arepossible in light of the above teachings without departing from thespirit or essential attributes thereof, and accordingly, referenceshould be had to the following claims, rather than to the foregoingspecification, as indicating the scope of the of the invention

It will be appreciated by persons skilled in the art that the presentinvention is not limited to what has been particularly shown anddescribed herein above. In addition, unless mention was made above tothe contrary, it should be noted that all of the accompanying drawingsare not to scale. A variety of modifications and variations are possiblein light of the above teachings without departing from the scope andspirit of the invention, which is limited only by the following claims.

1. A method for allocating addresses to a unique local network, themethod comprising: providing a brokered federated policy and identitymanagement system, the brokered federated policy and identity managementsystem having an address domain manager that allocates networkaddresses, the address domain manager arranged to interoperate with anetwork identity management module, the network identity managementmodule providing management of identity at an application level;receiving an authorization from the brokered federated policy andidentity management system; and assigning a network address to a uniquelocal network based on the authorization from the brokered federatedpolicy and identity management system.
 2. The method of claim 1, whereinassigning a network address to a unique local network includesauthenticating a user.
 3. The method of claim 2, wherein authenticatinga user includes passing an assertion token to a device of the user. 4.The method of claim 1, wherein assigning a network address to a uniquelocal network includes providing one or more user policies to a policyenforcement point network device, the policy enforcement point deviceenforcing network policies.
 5. The method of claim 1, wherein theaddress domain manager assigns a network address for a first secureunique local network.
 6. The method of claim 5, wherein the addressdomain manager assigns the network address for the first secure uniquelocal network to a device of a user.
 7. The method of claim 6, furthercomprising the step of: monitoring the data on the first secure uniquelocal network for anomalies.
 8. A system for allocating addresses tounique local networks, the system comprising: a brokered federatedpolicy and identity management system, the brokered federated policy andidentity management system having an address domain manager thatallocates network addresses, the address domain manager arranged tointeroperate with a network identity management module, the networkidentity management module providing management of identity at anapplication level.
 9. The system of claim 8 wherein the brokeredfederated policy and identity management system includes a policydecision function.
 10. The system of claim 8 wherein the brokeredfederated policy and identity management system includes anauthentication broker.
 11. The system of claim 8 wherein the brokeredfederated policy and identity management system includes a securenetwork access broker.
 12. The system of claim 8 wherein the brokeredfederated policy and identity management system includes a threatprotection system.
 13. The system of claim 8 further comprising a policyenforcement point.
 14. A method for allocating addresses to unique localnetworks, the method comprising: receiving notification of an attempt bya user to access a private network; assigning the user a first virtuallocal area network (VLAN); authenticating the user; passing an assertiontoken to a device of the authenticated user; assigning a common defaultaddress to the device of the user; receiving a request from the user toaccess a secured application, the secured application residing on afirst secure unique local network (SULN); and assigning a networkaddress to the first SULN.
 15. The method of claim 14, furthercomprising the step of: verifying an assertion token from the user; 16.The method of claim 14, further comprising the step of:
 17. The methodof claim 14, further comprising the step of: providing one or more userpolicies to a policy enforcement point network device, the policyenforcement point device enforcing network policies.
 18. The method ofclaim 14, further comprising the step of: assigning the network addressof the first secure unique local network (SULN) to the device of theuser.
 19. The method of claim 18, further comprising the step of:providing additional user policies to a policy enforcement point device,the policy enforcement point device enforcing network policies.
 20. Themethod of claim 18, further comprising the step of: monitoring the SULNwith a threat protection system, the threat protection system overseeingand monitoring of the first SULN for anomalies.